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Thee place of the law of arms control inn the international system
1.. Introduction
Thiss chapter will first portray arms control as a concept within the larger frameworkk of the international system for the maintenance of international peacee and security. Then, the subject matter of this study, the law of arms control,, will be introduced and defined as a special field of international law.. Next, rules of international law outside the law of arms control pertainingg to the armaments of States will be briefly dealt with. As such, this chapterr means to provide insights into the place of the law of arms control in thee system of general international law and international politics.
2.. Origins of and incentives for arms control in the international system

The international system and military power
Thee current international system is horizontal consisting of some 190 independentt States that are, in legal theory, all equal in that they all possess thee characteristics of sovereignty, and do not have to recognise anyone in authorityy over them {par in par em non habet imperium). i4 Within the internationall system, autonomy of the constituent States is a primary value. Autonomyy in general means that every State (through its government) is permittedd to decide for itself its internal political, economic, social, cultural systemm and its domestic policies, as well as its foreign policy and its relationss with other States. 35 Achieving and maintaining the maximum autonomyy possible for every State has been a primary purpose of internationall law. 36 Though the independence of States remains the ideal, thee international system is characterised by a tangle of complex interdependencies.. In the hectic interplay of world affairs the need is felt for aa regulatory framework, and international law fulfils that requirement. Ass a starting-point, it can be maintained that sovereign States can only be boundd to observe international law when and to the extent that they freely consentt to be bound. This point reflects an important characteristic of internationall law: there is no executive or governing entity to see that those whoo break the rules they consented to are corrected. 37 The use of force can bee considered as the ultimate means to correct wrongful behaviour and to enforcee compliance with international rules, but force may also be used in pursuitt of the national political aspirations of one State going against the interestss of other States. The legal fiction of the equality of States cannot andd does not take account of the unequal division of (military) power betweenn the States in the international system. To guarantee that the interdependencee of States does not lead to a loss of their independence, the usee of force has been generally outlawed and has been centralised by conferringg it on the international community as a whole. For this purpose, thee system of collective security as formulated under the Charter of the UN hass been established. The UN Charter declares peace to be the supreme value,, to secure not merely State autonomy, but fundamental order for all. Thee system involves the paradox of war for peace -peace being achieved throughh the collective capacity and will to resist. 38 Every infringement of the subjectivee right of a State not to be illegally attacked by other States constitutess a problem, not just for the State directly affected but for all memberss of the international community alike. The system of collective securityy thus implicitly acknowledges that security is indivisible, in that an attackk on one is of concern to all. 39 The system is meant to protect national interestss and sovereignty in a collective manner and to thereby lead to the strengtheningg of international security.
Thee collective security system aims at a broader objective than just the absencee of war by taking into account the wider requirements of internationall peace and security. An 'armed peace' is not sufficient to ensure securityy and therefore armed peace is insufficient to attain the purposes and principless of the UN Organisation. The concept of the system of collective securityy is based on the renunciation of force, except in self-defence, on commitmentt to the peaceful settlement of international disputes and on the obligationn to support collective measures, both military and non-military, to defeatt any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. 41 Thee core substantive principles of the UN, the prohibition of the threat or usee of force (Art. 2(4) UN Charter) and the complementary general provisionn to settle international disputes peacefully (Art. 2(3) UN Charter), aree the basic legal pillars of the collective security system. The Charter providess that disputes shall be settled peacefully in such a manner that internationall peace and security, and justice, are not endangered and prohibitss the threat or use of force by States in their international relations againstt the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in anyy other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN. The 'inherent' rightt to use force in individual or collective self-defence against an armed attackk is not impaired by the Charter system (Art. 51 UN Charter), so that it iss perfectly legitimate for a State to be a member of a military alliance that is basedd on the right to collective self-defence (usually referred to as 'assistance')) against any potential aggressor in case one of the member Statess of the alliance becomes the victim of aggression. International organisationss based on the principle of regional assistance against aggressionn can be found in all major regions of the world (America, Africa, Europe,, Southeast Asia, the Middle East). 42 Note, however, that such defensivee organisations cannot confer more rights on their member States thann those States individually have under the Charter system: in the event of aa conflict between the obligations of the Members of the UN under the Charterr and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligationss under the Charter shall prevail (Art. 103 UN Charter). Onee of the instruments for strengthening the regime prohibiting the use of forcee in international relations is arms control. Arms control has been 400 See Goodrich & Hambro (1949) , p. 93. 411 Cf. Art. 39 of the UN Charter. See United Nations (1986), p. 9 (par. 36). 422 explicitlyy linked to the goals of the elimination of the danger of war, in particularr nuclear war, as well as to ensuring that war is no longer a method off settling international disputes and that the threat and the use of force are eliminatedd from international life as provided for in the Charter of the UN. 43 Still,, under the Charter the control or reduction of armaments is only a secondaryy means, which should follow, and not precede, the setting up of a workablee system of security. The Charter does not set forth any ultimate goalss with regard to arms control. Instead, the few references to arms control inn the UN Charter only recognise the importance of the establishment of a systemm for the regulation of armaments in order to promote the establishmentt and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversionn of the world's human and economic resources for armaments (see Art.. 26 Charter). Arms control is not regarded as a direct means to attain collectivee security, but as part of another important task of the UN Organisation,, viz. the prevention of waste of economic resources. 44 The Charterr disapproves of the investment of precious labour, material, and moneyy in such 'wasting assets' as armaments. Furthermore, the UNGA may makee recommendations to the Members or to the UNSC or to both with regardd to the 'principles governing armaments and the regulation of armaments'' (Art. 11 Charter). The notion of 'regulation' discloses no bias to eitherr a high or a low level of armaments. There only is a tendency to disapprovee of the lack of regulation and the arms race, albeit more out of economicc than out of political concerns. Inn the theory of the collective security system, the UNSC has both the legal authorityy and the moral suasion to sanction the elimination of doomsday weaponss in the hands of irresponsible members of the international community. 455 Chapter VII of the Charter grants the UNSC a broad authority andd wide discretionary powers, enabling it (again, in theory) to take effectivee collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. 466 It is common knowledge that the collective security system in the UNN Charter has in practice never functioned as envisaged. Cold War oppositionn and a general lack of political will to co-operate have blocked consensuss in the UNSC for almost forty-five years, and no stand-by armed 'UNN forces' have ever been made available to the UNSC. 47 circumstancess have to a large extent precluded the UNSC from fulfilling the rolee of central decision-maker which it was accorded by the Charter in preventingg and countering aggression and in maintaining or restoring internationall peace and security. Thee role of the UN in arms control has struck a similar fate. After WW II, thee confrontation between East and West brought about a bi-polarization of thee world. This promoted distrust and insecurity which in turn triggered an arms-racee and the 'action-reaction' cycle, which proved to be a major factor inn continuing this race. The bipolar order was determined by the security policiess of the US and the SU. In the US, security policy was until the end of thee 1960s premised upon the containment of communism (Truman and Eisenhowerr doctrines), while later it was dominated by the doctrine of détentee (Kissinger-Nixon doctrine) and in more recent times by the 'encroachment'' doctrine of the Reagan era. The SU on the other hand, claimedd the right to exercise influence over security zones contiguous to its territory,, effectively extending its land border to prevent an invasion from thee West. It also claimed, under the Breznjev doctrine, the right to defend thee gains of international socialism. Despite ideological divisions, both sides foundd the power necessary to sustain these claims and policies in the nuclear capabilitiess of the Eastern and Western 'bloc'. 48 Apart from the fact that Coldd War opposition proved to be an impregnable stumbling-block on many occasionss to arms control as well, the Non-Aligned Countries on the one handd and the States within (nuclear) alliances on the other hand also stronglyy opposed each other, which has severely hampered international negotiationss on arms control. 49 Afterr the dissolution of the SU and the end of the Cold War in 1991, progresss has been made in the field of arms control, both bilaterally as well ass multilaterally. It has been much contended that a New World Order wouldd be on the verge of emerging. The post Cold War situation accelerated aa tendency to move UN organs to take action. Rather optimistically, the last decadee of the twentieth Century was proclaimed the 'Decade of Internationall Law' by the UNGA. 50 The successful collective effort to forces,, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintainingg international peace and security. Such agreements, which are a prescribed part of thee full implementation of the system for international peace and security under the UN Charter,, have never been concluded. 488 499 That is despite the fact that both the Non-Aligned and the 'Aligned' States subscribed to thee Final declaration of the UNGA Special Session on Disarmament, which declares that 'in accordancee with the Charter, the UN has a central role and primary responsibility in the spheree of disarmament' (SSOD-I (1978), par. 27). On the opposition between the several 'blocs'' in nuclear arms control negotiations, see Bourantonis (1993) . 500 See for the programme of action for the period 1997-1999, UNGA Res. 51/157, 16 counterr aggression in the (second) Gulf War (1990-1991) appeared to providee evidence that the positive changes in international relations would indeedd lead to unprecedented progress in the maintenance of international peacee and security. However, precisely during this last decade, the outer limitss of the system of collective security have been severely put to the test. Presumablyy as a result of the absence of Cold War opposition, the threat of forcee and even the actual use of force were employed on a number of occasions,, primarily by the US (and some of its allies), as the ultimate meanss to secure political interests without UNSC approval. 51 In the Europeann region, NATO has adopted 'new' security tasks and has assumed far-reachingg enforcement powers, which were not always supported by an expresss mandate from the UNSC. 52 It is clear that the contemporary internationall community still finds itself far from any centralised system of legislationn and law enforcement by specific organs modelled after that of States.. The threat of force even appears to be re-gaining the acceptance of Statess and international organisations as a legitimate means of exerting pressuree for political purposes in international relations. Throughout this study,, it will repeatedly come to the fore that arms control is closely related too the maintenance of national, as well as international, peace and security. Att this point, it suffices to note that disrespect for the basic rules of the collectivee security system in the long term can only have negative effects on thee international arms control process.
The (political) concept of arms control
Armss control can be described as an evolutionary process. 53 Beginning with thee development of a politically favourable environment, followed by a politicall commitment to negotiate, sometimes complemented by 'politically binding'' instruments, States with adversary interests, participating in the process,, finally agree that their individual security is better served if the armss competition between them is managed under agreed covenants. 54 The 'managing'' of an arms competition may take the form of a negotiated reductionn of military arms to zero or to a greatly reduced level, or may be designedd to seek the more modest goals of slowing the acquisition of arms orr directing those acquisitions in areas believed unlikely to lead to war. In otherr words, arms control refers to all kinds of agreements between two or moree States to limit or reduce certain categories of weapons or military operationss to diminish tensions and the possibility of conflict.
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Theree is no generally accepted definition of 'arms control'. Descriptions or definitionss of the contents of the notion of 'arms control' (and also 'disarmament')) have been based on the goals that States want or wanted to pursuee with it. Thus, 'arms control' has been described as a policy of reducingg or eliminating instabilities in the military field with the primary aimm of lessening the probability and possibility of outbreak of war (accidentallyy or deliberately caused, with emphasis on the avoidance of nuclearr war).
56 'Arms control' has also been defined as changes in the numbers,, types, and qualities of weapons; changes in their configurations; andd other modifications that affect their use or effectiveness in order to reducee the chance of war, especially nuclear war. 57 Other definitions inter aliaalia refer to 'all measures, directly related to military forces, adopted by governmentss to contain the costs and harmful consequences of the continued existencee of arms (their own and others), within the overall objective of sustainingg and enhancing their security', 58 and to 'all the forms of military co-operationn between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihoodd of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economicc costs of being prepared for it '. 59 Many other definitions have been provided,, by various authors. These and other definitions vary from conceptss including disarmament, arms limitation but also an increase of weaponss if it appears to be in the interest of national or world security to do so,, to more narrow concepts making a strict distinction between the notion off arms control and the notion of disarmament.
60 Again others favour the wordd 'disarmament' since it is understood to cover all degrees of reduction off armaments, and it includes the pre-emption of options for further arms 544 Cf. Duffy (1988), p. 1. 555 See McCausland (1996) developmentt (non-armament) as well as measures for regulating the productionn or use of arms quantity or quality. 61 Or, 'disarmament' is taken ass encompassing a broad spectrum of measures relating to the regulation, limitation,, reduction and elimination of armaments, armed forces and militaryy expenditures, as well as limitations or prohibitions on the development,, testing, production, emplacement, deployment, proliferation andd transfer or use of arms.
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Inn summary, it becomes clear that arms control (and disarmament) has consistentlyy been described as part of a larger process aimed at international stabilityy and security, and at the reversal of the arms race and the avoidance off war or large-scale international armed conflict. Arms control is therefore nott considered an end in itself, but instead has been perceived as a means to achievee the objective of improved security and, through that, to reduce the chancee of war. A 'common sense' appreciation of what constitutes 'war' or (large-scale)) 'international armed conflict' is favoured here, in that both termss comprise international hostilities irrespective of formal declaration or itss absence. 
The changing scope of 'arms control'
Ass already appears from the above, over time the scope of the term 'arms control'' has changed in rather profound ways. Initially, the conception of armss control was largely influenced by the outbreak of the major wars of the twentiethh century. After WW I, it was thought that the abundant availability off arms and the willingness to use them had brought about the war. Thus, thee belief that a high level of armaments could in itself present a danger to peacee explains why the Covenant of the League of Nations placed principal emphasiss on disarmament. After WW II, there was the belief that had the Alliess been more extensively armed and ready to use their forces, the war mightt have been averted. It is therefore not surprising that the idea that the maintenancee of a high level of national armaments is a positive danger to peacee is not proclaimed in the Charter of the UN. Still, generally speaking, untill the 1960s the concept of arms control was virtually synonymous with disarmament.. In this interpretation, arms control refers to the reduction of thee number of weapons; 'control' over 'arms' was exercised by reducing theirr numbers, that is, limiting and reducing inventories of weapons. wass on the reduction of strategic weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclearr weapons, by the 1960s the meaning of arms control had changed to thee reduction of the chance of war, primarily as a result of the development off the deterrence paradigm. According to the deterrence paradigm, stability inn the sense of reducing the chance of war is achieved when each of the contendingg States has enough capability to inflict unacceptable damage on thee other side in a retaliatory second strike, after the other side has inflicted thee first strike (deterrence by threat of retaliation), or when each of those Statess has the ability to overcome the effects of the first strike and continues too prosecute effective operations and prevail in the conflict (deterrence by denial).. Arms control serving the policy of deterrence involved any initiativee that would reduce the chance of war, particularly nuclear war; reducee damage in case war did occur; and reduce the cost of defence. Thee change in the interpretation of the term 'arms control' from reducing thee number of weapons to reducing the chance of war involved a substantial broadeningg of interpretation. It could even amount to the opposite of the armss control process in its 'original' meaning. For the deterrence paradigm couldd -in circumstances of inequality in arms and imbalance of powerscalll for more weapons, precisely in order to reduce the chance of war.
66 By thee late 1970s, the meaning of arms control had once again changed, partly ass a result of the wide attention given to the SALT/START process, to an interpretationn which emphasised the strictly US-Soviet negotiations on limitingg or reducing strategic weapons. 67 This confining of arms control to bilaterall negotiated weapons reductions narrowed even the earlier, 'arms reduction'' interpretation, which allowed also for reductions stemming from multilaterall negotiated agreements. During the 1980s, arms control increasinglyy focused on the problem of (horizontal 68 ) proliferation of weaponss of mass destruction. Critical to controlling proliferation is controllingg the means of weapons production rather than limiting their deployment.. In this view, the possession of weapons of mass destruction, andd not the inclination of a State to use them, is the 'offensive' activity that shouldd be controlled. 69 In line with this development, the UNSC in 1992 declaredd that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction eo ipso constitutess a threat to international peace and security. 70 Strategicc Concept likewise emphasises the threat of proliferation of weapons off mass destruction and declares that the Alliance and its members have theirr own non-proliferation goal, viz. to prevent proliferation from occurring or,, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. 71 Also coupled withh non-proliferation goals is the assurance of the NWS not to threaten or usee nuclear weapons against States who do not possess nuclear weapons: onlyy States that participate in the Non-Proliferation Regime are entitled to thosee security assurances.
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Betweenn the superpowers, in the first place the US and the then SU, arms controll was instrumental in sustaining a stable 'balance of power' between 19455 and 1991. During the Cold War period, arms control was given the highestt priority in the pursuit of international security and stability. The comprehensivee arms control agreements concluded towards the end of the Coldd War (INF Treaty, START-I Treaty, CFE Treaty) are testimony of the factt that the predominant paradigm during the Cold War had been narrowed downn to a consideration of arms control almost exclusively concerned with thee maintenance of strategic (nuclear) stability between the superpowers. plannedd military balances. Since the end of the Cold War, a further refinementt of the arms control contained in this legacy has been taking place.. The ongoing efforts towards reducing the number of strategic nuclear weaponss between the USA and Russia (START-Ü and presumably START-IE),, as well as the revision of the 1990 CFE Treaty in order to adapt it to the changedd security environment in Europe, reveal an ongoing pursuit of global andd regional military balances, albeit based on lower levels of armaments. 76 Furthermore,, it is considered that nuclear weapons in Europe will remain valuablee in the post Cold War security environment, both inside and outside NATO'ss collective deterrent. 77 Likewise, the majority of Russian politicians andd experts in areas of arms control and disarmament stick to the models andd tools developed during the Cold War and in the bipolar world.
78 Even (recent)) arms control efforts that to a large extent have been inspired by humanitariann considerations, such as efforts leading to the outlawing of chemicall weapons and of anti-personnel landmines, have been specifically consideredd in the context of strategic military stability and security. havee been termed the 'poor man's nuclear bomb', thereby illustrating their (potential)) role in the context of balancing military power relations. 80 As a finall illustration, it has been upheld with regard to biological weapons that theirr relatively early outlawing was feasible (long before chemical disarmamentt could be discussed) because of their low strategic value in warfare. .
3.. The security context of arms control
The interrelationship between national and international security
Thee collective security system of the UN Charter is first of all devoted to the maintenancee of international peace and security (Art. 1(1) Charter). As has beenn mentioned, international peace can be perceived to be maintained in thee absence of international war (negative peace), but it is clear that such an 'armedd peace' with the fear of war as the recurrent theme is not sufficient forr the achievement of the purposes of the UN and cannot be considered satisfactoryy for the avoidance of large-scale armed conflict in the long run. Peacee must be accompanied by a feeling of security, security from war in particular.. The notion of 'international security' should therefore not be identifiedd with that of 'international peace'. It has a meaning of its own, whichh warrants separate analysis. 'Security'' has both an objective and a subjective meaning. Security in its objectivee meaning refers to the condition of being protected from or not exposedd to danger, while subjective refers to freedom from care, anxiety or apprehension,, a feeling of safety. 82 On the international level, the objective 'condition'' of security cannot be established without (the governments of) Statess 'feeling' subjectively secure. Therefore, in principle, international securityy can be described as a condition in which States consider that there iss no danger of military attack, political pressure or economic coercion, so thatt they are able to freely pursue their own development and progress. Thee attainment of the objective of security has been one of the most profoundd aspirations of all time of States all over the world. Traditionally, Statess are faced with a security dilemma, in that efforts to increase one Treaty,, that was adopted at that Conference (3 May 1996). Likewise, the US felt unable to accedee to the 1997 APM Convention because of concerns about its ability to defend the borderr between South Korea and the DPRK in case of a sudden attack; see Vagts (2000) State'ss security are generally achieved at the cost of increasing another's msecurity. 844 No single State can gain absolute security. 85 Individual States mayy temporarily achieve an increase in their security through the developmentt of their military capabilities but they will ultimately be negativelyy affected by off-setting measures undertaken by other States and thee resulting deterioration in international security. 86 Even the great empires off ancient times (such as Rome and China) eventually could not maintain theirr security without the help of others. Likewise, in today's organised communityy of States, no absolute security can be attained by any one single Statee and security policies must take into account the broad and complex issuess of the interrelationship between national and international security, as welll as between military and non-military aspects of security. Security is a relativee term and national as well as international security need to be viewed ass matters of degree. Degrees of international security necessarily are both thee result and the sum of the (relative) security of each and every State memberr of the international community. Because of this interrelationship andd in order to escape the traditional security dilemma, a co-operative approachh by States towards security is imperative. Thee relative balance of military power between the States in a given region hass always been an important factor taken into consideration by States when addressingg their security concerns. By way of (secret) pacts, all kinds of alliances,, treaties of guarantee, treaties of friendship and treaties of neutrality,, States have tried to find a balance of power reconciling national securityy interests with international security. 87 As such, the concept of balancee of power has often been the basis for the formation of military alliancess ever since it was introduced in the sixteenth century. 88 Even though thee preamble to the Covenant of the League of Nations introduced the maintenancee of international peace and security as a central goal to be attainedd by the League, true 'pactomania' still reigned within the framework off the Covenant. The Members of the League continued to adhere to existingg bilateral and regional pacts and alliances and concluded new ones, oftenn in secret. After WW II, this practice was not ruled out in the frameworkk of the UN Charter. In its Chapter VIII, the Charter expressly recognisess the importance of regional arrangements to supplement the collectivee security system. New (defensive) alliances, as well as regional 888 According to Verosta (1971), p. 537, the principle of the balance of power (Princip des Gleichgewichts)) was introduced from physics into historical science by Guiccardini in the 16 th Century. . organisationss with broader purposes were established on the basis of treaties concludedd openly. Since the Charter in addition explicitly recognises the inherentt right to use force in individual and collective self-defence (Art. 51), alll States evidently have the right to maintain military capabilities for purposess of national defence and collective action and they have the right to bee militarily prepared in matters concerning their own security, as well as in matterss concerning the security of the members of their alliance. These provisionss can be seen as a recognition of the fact that absolute international securityy cannot be provided by the collective security system of the Charter. Thee survival of States has indeed, in certain cases, effectively depended on whetherr they could count on their own means of defence. Yet it cannot be disregardedd that the uncontrolled accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclearr weapons, may constitute much more of a threat to, than a protection of,, the security of States. History has shown that in the end an uncontrolled armss race, that is, the unabated competitive qualitative and quantitative strengtheningg of military capabilities, impairs international confidence, stabilityy and hence security. Although States have the right to defend their ownn security, they all bear responsibility to ensure that their national securityy policies do not jeopardise international security. If States pursue securityy policies that rely on their own military strength and broadly defined nationall interests, serious problems may arise for international security. Interpretationss of 'national security' and 'vital national interests' in ways thatt condone the use or threat of force against the territorial integrity of otherr States, interference in their internal affairs and the projection of nationall security interests to the territory of other States constitute examples off this. 89 Still, it is important that in the course of pursuing the international armss control process, the need of States to protect their security during that processs is being taken into account. For as much as an uncontrolled arms racee threatens international security, uncoordinated disarmament would upsett the balance of power and could therefore turn out to be detrimental to internationall security.
The interrelationship between arms control and security
Inn international relations, both policies of disarmament and arms limitation, andd policies to maintain and develop military capabilities are pursued as a meanss to promote security. Whether a State will seek security in arms limitationn or in arms accumulation, is -as long as it remains within the boundariess of international law -a subject of national policy. 90 nationall arms control policies are pursued depends on the concepts of securityy that States adhere to. 91 The concepts of security that are primarily reflectedd in arms control policies are combinations of the concept of balance off power and the concept of deterrence. In general, arms control as an elementt of balance of power-politics aims at promoting the creation or preservationn of an equivalence in power between two or more States or groupss of States. In addition, deterrence policies are pursued by the NWS, of whichh the relatively small, yet invulnerable, nuclear forces provide a basis forr strategic parity and equality in security. 92 Both concepts of security can bee adhered to at a lower or a higher level of armaments, although the conceptt of deterrence may contain incentives for increasing weapons stocks. Inn order to work, the concept of deterrence requires a level of military force thatt is capable of deterring any potential aggression against it, and of stoppingg an aggressor's advance as far forward as possible should an attack neverthelesss occur (i.e. to deter and counter aggression). Still, as (groups of) Statess gain confidence through experience in the security concept of deterrence,, they become more willing to rely on that concept for maintaining stabilityy against resort to weapons, i.e. to rely upon their adversaries to adoptt the same perspectives they have adopted against aggression. Potential adversaries,, in a concerted effort, may then agree to pursue policies of deterrencee at a lower level of armaments. Inn theory, deterrence as a military security concept may be pursued with conventionall weapons and with all kinds of weapons of mass destruction. 93 However,, the potential role of chemical and biological weapons in deterrencee policies has greatly diminished as a result of the entry into force off the BWC and the CWC. 94 What has remained is nuclear deterrence, whichh relies on the possession of offensive nuclear capabilities that would bee used against an adversary in the event that that adversary were to initiate conflict,, and which, against other NWS, relies on a concept known as Mutuallyy Assured Destruction (MAD). 95 This strategic concept refers to a situationn in which large-scale nuclear attack is deterred by the threat of nuclearr retaliatory strike on the territory of the adversary, so that the first usee of nuclear weapons becomes suicidal. Nuclear deterrence policies Conceptss of security are the different bases on which States and the international communityy as a whole rely for their security. See United Nations (1986), p. (v).
Currently,, there are seven States that overtly signal the possession of nuclear weapons as partt of their security policy, viz. China, France, Russia, the UK, the US, India and Pakistan. 9i9i Cf Gray (2000), p. 256-257.
Inn case a State should want to rely on the security concept of deterrence with biological and chemicall weapons, it would have to maintain those weapons in its arsenals not only to deter thee use of this type of weapons against it, but also to provide a retaliatory capability if deterrencee failed. Strict adherence to the CWC and the BWC definitely makes this impossible. Cf.Cf. in this respect The Alliance's Strategic Concept (1999), par. 57: "Alliance Strategy does nott include a chemical or biological warfare capability". 955 Cf Rimanelii (1992), esp. p. 313-314. actuallyy constitute their own variant of the concept of balance of power, seekingg stability by deterring aggression. Between the NWS there is a balancee of nuclear arsenals, which can be described as a 'balance of terror'. 966 The central balance between the superpowers is reinforced by the existencee of medium-sized nuclear powers (France, the UK and China), whichh helps to dissuade the superpowers from attacking one another becausee the other powers could intervene and exploit whatever attrition occurredd as a result of the initial conflict. 97 It has been asserted that nuclear weaponss make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression againstt those who possess them incalculable and unacceptable and that nuclearr weapons thus remain essential to preserve peace. 98 In a recent Advisoryy Opinion, the ICJ in this regard confined itself to noting that in orderr to be effective, the policy of nuclear deterrence necessitates that the intentionn to use nuclear weapons be credible. Whether this constitutes a 'threat'' contrary to Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter depends upon whether the particularr use of force envisaged would be directed against the territorial integrityy or political independence of a State or against the purposes of the UNN or whether, in the event that it were intended as a means of defence, it wouldd necessarily violate the principles of necessity and proportionality. Whetherr nuclear weapons might exclusively be used against other nuclear weaponss ('no first use' of nuclear weapons) is still open to legal and politicall debate. As long as this issue is not perfectly clear, and as yet it is not,, nuclear weapons can serve both politically and legally to deter the use off any kind of weapon (conventional, chemical, biological, nuclear). Reconcilingg deterrence, which emphasises the importance of possessing nuclearr weapons, with non-proliferation goals, which necessitate the opposite,, could become one of the most fundamental dilemmas of post-Cold Warr strategy for Western States.
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Securityy and arms control are closely interrelated, both on the national and thee international level. Each State will carefully scrutinise its security when consideringg concrete proposals for arms control. States are not likely to adoptt far-reaching measures of arms control unless effective means to providee international security are available. The interrelationship between thee achievement of measures of arms control, especially those involving disarmament,, and the establishment of an effective system of international securityy is complex. The dilemma whether to seek international security 966 Cf. Wohlstetter (1958); see also Nagan (1999), at p. 489-490. Note that the possession of nuclearr weapons for the purpose of pursuing credible policies of mutual deterrence implies thee right not only to develop and stockpile those weapons, but also to refine and adjust them ass the security situation or technological developments demand. 97 SeeQuester (1992) throughh arms control or to seek arms control by way of international security paralysedd inter alia the disarmament efforts conducted under the auspices of thee League of Nations, 101 and has wisely been avoided under the system of thee UN Charter. As mentioned, the UN Charter incorporates the concept that thee realisation of its system for the maintenance of international peace and securityy would facilitate arms control and even disarmament proper, and at thee same time it considers the elaboration and implementation of measures forr the regulation of armaments to be valuable in promoting the maintenance off international peace and security. As such, security and arms control have beenn de-coupled under the Charter in the sense that the possible contention thatt failure to bring about an early and substantial reduction of armaments wouldd be tantamount to the failure of the whole system of collective security off the UN has been refuted in advance, whereas at the same time the maintenancee of peace and security and the proper functioning of the collectivee security system have not been made dependent on the progress in armss control. A similar approach to avoid the dilemma can be found in the 19999 Strategic Concept of NATO, which on the one hand declares to seek to achievee its security objectives by way of a policy of support for arms control andd disarmament (par. 40), thus seeking security through arms control, whereass on the other hand it states that "by deterring the use of NBC weapons,, [the Alliance's forces] contribute to Alliance efforts aimed at preventingg the proliferation of these weapons and their delivery means" (par.. 41). This latter assumption considers deterrence (the core objective of thee security concept) as a means to prevent the proliferation of weapons of masss destruction (an objective of arms control), and therefore arms control iss sought through security. Progresss in arms control (in particular measures involving disarmament) and inn the strengthening of international security must be looked upon as parallel meanss in the effort to preserve peace and to prevent war. Thus, making specificc steps in one of these processes a prerequisite for specific steps in thee other leads to deadlock. Parallelism and co-ordination of measures in bothh the arms control and the security field are the only logical and practical solutionss to the problem. 102 Starting from the idea that a military equilibrium,, including a strategic balance, is a peace-preserving factor, arms controll should contribute to such equilibrium by stabilising military balancess at a substantially lower level of armaments, and, between the NWS,, by making mutual deterrence less likely to result in war. When this coursee of action is continuously aspired to, arms control effectively supports thee maintenance of international peace and security. 
2
The interrelationship between law and politics in the field of arms control control
Itt has been argued that arms control is inter alia meant to strike a balance betweenn the individual objective of maintaining national security and the collectivee objective of maintaining international security. The direct connectionn between arms control and the security of a State, in the national ass well as in the international sense, is one of the most important characteristicss of the arms control process, prominently present in arms controll politics but also in arms control law. Both lawyers and politicians havee their own views regarding what 'ought to be' in arms control. Their viewss may conflict and maybe a decision-maker has good reasons to disobey aa rule -for whatever reason, be it moral or immoral, egoistic or altruistic, humanitariann or State-interested. But the lawyer's role is not to facilitate the decision-maker'ss dilemma between law and politics (and, occasionally, betweenn law and morals), but to clarify the legal side of things.
103 Still, even iff what ought to be has been laid down in legally binding norms, it does not meann that arms control is a purely legal issue. The lawyer is only acting as a lawyerr when formulating or interpreting legal norms, not in the determinationn of what 'should be'. 104 It can be maintained that arms control policiess have as their common objective the improvement of political relationss among States by creating, through an intensive dialogue and habituall co-operation, a set of principles, norms and rules that govern the militaryy dimension of inter-State relations;
105 the creation of arms control laww can be understood as a fundamental objective of (co-operative) arms controll policies. Internationall law as a 'legal order' is constantly influenced and, to a certain extent,, even conditioned by external factors in its formation, adaptation, and implementation.. It has already been mentioned that the horizontal organisationn of the international system as a whole, in that States recognise noo higher authority above them, makes its influence felt strongly in the field off arms control. The level of armaments present in a State has since long beenn perceived as an asset of the State's sovereignty and decisions relating too national armament have therefore always been entrusted to the governmentt of the State. States have always been cautious about allowing theirr behaviour with regard to their national armaments to be governed by internationall law, precisely because it is so closely connected to their nationall security. Probably more than in any other field of international relations,, the treaties relating to arms control mirror the division of power in thee international system. The substantive norms contained in arms control treatiess represent the common denominator of the maximal amount of selfrestraintt that is attainable for the most powerful States and allow States' expectationss to converge on an equilibrium behaviour that, once achieved, noo one has incentives to violate. 106 To what extent an arms control treaty contributess to supporting such equilibrium behaviour naturally depends on thee number of participating States. It is true, that because the process of armss control may affect the security interests of all States alike, as many Statess as possible should be actively concerned with and contribute to measuress of arms control; no arms control is feasible without international co-operation.. A maximal number of participating States (the aim of universality)) helps to create confidence among States and is correlated to the strengthh and relevance of arms control treaties: the more States are Parties to thee treaty, the more the treaty may contribute to balancing security interests. Thee conclusion of arms control treaties by some States evidently has divergentt consequences for their security, depending on whether other Statess decide to remain outside the arms control treaty, and, if so, what States.. This reality may give rise to difficulties, for it is a general principle off law governing the legal relationship between participating States and 'third'' (non-participating) States that pacta tertiis nee nocent nee prosunt, i.e.. treaties neither harm nor favour third States. 107 Over time, different solutionss to the problem of defining the relationship between States Parties too arms control treaties and non-participating States have been sought, e.g. byy allowing States Parties to make reservations in which the protection offeredd by the treaty is declared valid only towards other States Parties, or byy arranging possible 'third party effects' by way of specific provisions. 108 Nowadays,, the (political) need of balancing security interests in arms controll law has been recognised in standard withdrawal clauses which can bee found in almost all arms control treaties currently in force and which workk between the Parties to the treaty. On the basis of such clauses, States havee the right (in exercising their national sovereignty) to withdraw from the armss control treaty if they decide that extraordinary events related to the subjectt matter of the treaty have jeopardised their supreme interests. 'supremee interests' of States in the field of arms control (the 'subject matter' off the treaties involved) relate to their security interests. 110 The standard escapee clause grants a right of withdrawal irrespective of the source of the eventss jeopardising the security of the States Parties. Therefore, in case a 'third'' State (non-Party) were to directly endanger the security of a State Partyy to the arms control treaty, the latter could exercise its right of withdrawall if it considered this necessary in order to protect its national security.. States will only withdraw from arms control treaties, which are afterr all very important to the maintenance of international security and stability,, if their national security is in direct danger. States need a possibilityy to escape their obligations by denouncing the treaty as a final resortt in order to safeguard their sovereignty. If it is attempted to impose obligationss on a State that it is no longer willing to accept, there is a profoundd risk of losing entirely the already weak means of pressure in internationall law through which one may hope to exercise a beneficial influencee on States. Whereass arms control policies appear to be developed to answer the questionn why and to what extent arms must be controlled (by the law), the legall aspects of arms control focus on the question how this control should takee place in legal terms and by whom, once political agreement that it shouldd take place has in principle been reached. With this in mind, it is time too turn to the law of arms control.
4.. The law of arms control: definition
The law of arms control as a special branch of international law
Onee cannot attempt to make an analysis of important developments in some branchh of law without formulating, as a starting-point, a definition of this branchh of law. A branch -or field -of (international) law can be described ass a body of coherent legal rules governing a certain area of international relations,, defined by the scope of legal regulation and containing certain speciall characteristics. Before addressing its special characteristics, it is importantt that a definition be provided of the branch of law that is central to thiss study. It could be argued that the law of arms control consists of the 'commonn denominators' of national arms control policies, as laid down in legallyy binding documents. There is however more to it than this. For when enteringg a field of international law, States become legally bound to observe theirr obligations pursuant to the agreements they have concluded in this field,field, notwithstanding the possible changes in their national policies. Noncompliancee with provisions in arms control agreements not only has politicall consequences but legal ones as well, such as international 1100 See Krutzsch & Trapp (1994), p. 248. responsibilityy of the violating State. Furthermore, depending on the kind of supervisoryy mechanisms present in the treaty, other legal consequences may resultt from non-compliance, such as the obligation to enter into consultationss with other States Parties or the obligation to follow prescribed proceduress for the pacific settlement of disputes in case such settlement is sought. . Thee law of arms control is studied here as a special branch of international law.. That is to say, it is considered that the law of arms control is composed off a number of systems of legal norms that are related because of their commonn subject matter, viz. the regulation of national armaments, and their commonn ultimate objective, viz. the achievement of general and complete disarmamentt under strict and effective international control. Attempts to identifyy arms control law as a special branch of international law have only beenn made quite recently. 111 As in other fields of international relations, the realisationn of arms control implies the establishment of the necessary legal framework,, substantiating the State's agreement on principles and rules, obligationss and rights, as a means to achieve the common objectives pursued.. A quite impressive collection of treaties nowadays constitutes the basiss for this framework of international law aimed at the regulation of armaments.. Both multilateral and bilateral treaties refer to earlier arms controll treaties as the source of their own conclusion and of the obligation to furtherr negotiate and conclude more advanced agreements. As a direct result off the close interrelationship and interdependence of all arms control treaties (andd related documents), a special branch of contemporary international law iss created, which comes under the broader field of the rules of international 1111 See Mrazek (1987), p. 89: "Until recently, arms control and disarmament measures were treatedd as parts of 'International Security Law', being the set of norms of international law directlyy concerned with ensuring peace and preventing war, i.e. primarily with the implementationn of the principle of the non-use of force". See also Lysén, (1990), p. 11 and p. 222,, in which the author identifies the 'Law of Disarmament' as a special branch of public internationall law; Feldman (1991), p. 35: "The failure, until recently, to investigate the internationall law of arms control as such or in connection with works on arms control and disarmament,, has resulted in a hiatus in the science of international law". He identifies arms controll and disarmament as part of the 'Law of International Security'; Bolintineanu (1987), p.. 22, who tries to review "certain trends in the forming of what might be called in the future thee international law of disarmament, as a new branch of public international law of today" ; Blixx (2000), p. 41: "(...) one may marvel that the legal rules on arms control and disarmament (...)) have expanded to such an extent that they now constitute a separate body of law next to otherr new bodies of international law (...)". Finally, see Myjer (1980), p. 301: "(...) the materiall presented in this study can be regarded as theoretical groundwork for a new Chapter inn international law on the control and limitation of arms: 'the law of weapons'.", and Myjer (1995),, p. 547: "The law of arms control is a sub-area of the international law of military security."" Greenwood (1998), identifies 'the law of weaponry, which seeks to regulate both thee means and methods of warfare', and, remarkably, considers that to be 'one of the oldest andd best established areas of the laws of war' (whereas almost all arms control law is designed too work in times of peace as well). laww relating to international peace and security. 112 The following definition off that branch, the law of arms control, is used: 113 thee law of arms control is that part of public international law which dealss both with the restrictions internationally placed upon the freedomm of behaviour of States with regard to their national armaments,, and with the applicable supervisory mechanisms.
Itt follows from this definition that the law of arms control, like other fields off law, has two components: a substantive part, that will be referred to as substantivee arms control law, and an institutional part, that will be referred too as institutional arms control law. The first part of the above definition referss to the substantive law of arms control and will be clarified and explainedd first.
The substantive law of arms control
Inn the first part of the definition, which reads ' [the law that deals with] the restrictionss internationally placed upon the freedom of behaviour of States withh regard to their national armaments', the term 'behaviour' (of a State) nott only encompasses dynamic behaviour -i.e. behaviour comprising some kindd of (productive) activity, such as testing, production, transfer, trade, stockpiling,, deployment and use of armaments, but also more static behaviour,, such as research and development and possession of armaments. Thee term 'freedom' (of behaviour) is used, because it is alleged that, as a principle,, States are free to behave as they like with regard to their national armaments,, as long as restrictions have not been accepted by them. As the ICJJ observed: "State practice shows that the illegality of the use of certain weaponss as such does not result from an absence of authorisation but, on the contrary,, is formulated in terms of prohibition," and: "in international law theree are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the State concerned,, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereignn State can be limited. withoutt prejudice to rules of customary international law, that become bindingg on States without their express consent to be bound. However, exceptt for some of the specific obligations not to use weapons with certain characteristics,, it is extremely doubtful that any such norms exist in the field off arms control law (see infra, chapter [3]). Thee words 'internationally placed' are used to emphasise that the law of armss control is part of public international law, which operates between sovereignn States. Contracts between governments and public or private enterprisess or individuals fall outside the scope of the law of arms control. Alsoo national laws, that e.g. restrict the possession of small arms to the policee forces or similar internal security forces, clearly fall outside the scope off the law of arms control (the permanent use of the adjective 'international' beforee the words 'law of arms control' seems exaggerated and superfluous, sincee in fact no comparable national laws exist on the subject). The same is truee for all kind of 'political' declarations that do not set norms but merely indicatee the existence of certain intentions; since they are not part of binding internationall law, they too fall outside the scope of the law of arms control. Thee term 'restrictions' refers to qualitative and quantitative limitations, such ass circumscription of the character of certain behaviour (e.g. testing of nuclearr weapons only for peaceful purposes), or numerical limitations placedd on (static) behaviour (e.g. prescribed levels of certain categories of 'heavy'' conventional armaments in Europe), or a combination of both quantitativee and qualitative limitations (e.g. prescribed limits on the number off strategic nuclear weapons and on the maximum number of delivery vehicless allowed per nuclear missile). 'Restriction' can also be endeavoured byy way of (near) total prohibitions, which would amount to disarmament. In thiss study, disarmament is considered to be the most far-reaching form of armss control rather than a distinct notion. 115 Disarmament means that the restrictionss placed on the behaviour of States consist of prohibitions to possesss armaments above a set limit, which lies beneath the level of armamentss that this State already possesses. Thee term 'national armaments' refers to all military capabilities that a State possessess for defensive and offensive purposes (including military operationss within the framework of the UN). They include conventional armamentss of all sorts, as well as weapons of mass destruction and all relatedd delivery systems. 'National armaments' can also relate to armed forcess (troops) and their training, but legally binding restrictions on the armedd forces of a State are normally only found in peace treaties, where the victorr State(s) impose this kind of restrictions on the vanquished State(s). Thiss study concentrates on arms control law that has been negotiated freely inn peace time between sovereign States. Therefore, any discussion of forced 1155 See for a comparable view, Goldblat (1994), p. 3. restrictionss on armed forces pursuant to peace treaties will be limited to thosee cases the historical value of which merits discussion. Thee focus on (the behaviour of) 'States' is to denote that arms control law is State-oriented,, State-made and largely State-dominated. Naturally also publicc and private national industries, such as chemical industries, must complyy with the restrictions that have been imposed on the freedom of behaviourr of the States of which they bear the nationality. It is a principle of internationall law that States take the action necessary to enable the implementationn of their international obligations in their national legal order.
1166 However, as the definition already shows this study will not go into nationall implementation measures, such as the national laws that must be enactedd by States that apply the dualist system in order for international law too become applicable in that State, nor will it deal with related legal problems,, such as problems that may arise as a result of weapons-producing publicc and private companies situated outside the territory but still under the jurisdictionn or control of a State Party to applicable arms control treaties.
The institutional law of arms control
Thee second part of the definition, 'the applicable supervisory mechanisms', referss to the institutional law of arms control. Since focus will be principally onn this part of the law of arms control, the clarifications provided here are provisionall and will be elaborated in the following chapters. Ass has already been mentioned, there exists no general legal principle that forcess States to conclude arms control agreements. The law of arms control thereforee starts at a point where States are already prepared, in principle, to limitt their freedom of behaviour with regard to their national armaments, becausee they expect it will serve their interests best. But even then, arms controll law can only attain its objectives if States somehow gain the confidencee that they will mutually act in compliance with the arms control agreementt they entered into. 117 In practice, the conditions under which Statess are prepared to trust each other in the sensitive field of arms control havee been embodied in supervisory mechanisms. The term 'supervisory mechanisms'' refers to legal arrangements on the basis of which control of compliancee by the States (or by other persons on their behalf) with arms controll obligations can take place. Supervisory mechanisms (in arms control treatiess often referred to as 'control systems') encompass not only methods off supervision, but also a whole complex of provisions that regulate under whatt circumstances, with what purposes and by what body according to whatt specific procedures of decision-making, those methods may be used, i.e.. the institutional design. As we will see (infra, Chapter [4]), the institutionall design of the arms control treaty is crucial to the implementationn of the treaty and the effective functioning of the entire processs of (international) supervision of compliance. Thee adjective 'applicable' is used to indicate that different supervisory mechanismss relate to different arms control agreements; supervision of arms controll law is largely treaty-specific. The supervisory mechanisms that are 'applicable',, are found in the arms control treaties proper, as well as in certainn areas of general international law (such as the law of treaties and the lawss of war).
The common ultimate objective of the arms control process
Whateverr the specific subject matter of the legal instruments that together constitutee the law of arms control, they are always considered by the Contractingg Parties as a step in the arms control process on the way towards achievingg the common ultimate objective of 'general and complete disarmamentt under strict and effective international control', or more limitedd 'higher' goals in that respect. The quest for general and complete disarmamentt stems from the conviction that the complete elimination of somee category of weapons (such as chemical or nuclear weapons) offers the onlyy effective guarantee against the threat or use of such weapons. General andd complete disarmament comes down to the dismantling and destruction orr the reduction and abolition of armaments, at most to a level necessary for thee State to maintain internal law and order (and to contribute to the enforcementt of international obligations by common action). For disarmament,, even in its general and complete form as the outcome of the armss control process, does not denote the complete absence of weapons at thee national level. States have the right to maintain internal order and to retainn military capabilities to that end. Some additional capability, necessary too deliver a proportional contribution to the defence of international law and orderr outside the State territory in the context of operations of the UN or of regionall organisations must remain available, too. Thee first proposals to come to general and complete disarmament as the outcomee of the arms control process stem from the period of the League of Nations,, during which a high level of armaments was considered to constitutee a danger to the peace per se. After WW II, the UN established a propositionn of its own: a high level of national armaments is only a danger too peace if it is not general, for the relative unpreparedness of one part of the worldd will always encourage aggression." 8 This may account for the continuedd emphasis on general and complete disarmament after WW II, albeitt that it is safe to assume that between both World Wars the focus in Martinn (1952) , p. 58. armss control shifted from the notion that 'general and complete disarmament shouldd take place' to the consideration that 'should disarmament take place, itt should be general and complete'. Thee principle that plans for the reduction of armaments need to be of a generall and complete character has remained the point of departure, as is shownn by references to general and complete disarmament in many internationall documents, covering either a single category of weapons (e.g. nuclearr weapons) or referring to unqualified disarmament. 119 The preambles too several arms control treaties declare that the treaties constitute a step towardss general and complete disarmament (and towards more limited higherr goals in their subject area). 120 The related obligation to pursue negotiationss in good faith leading to a 'treaty on general and complete disarmamentt under strict and effective international control' has likewise beenn repeated many times. 121 With regard to nuclear weapons, the ICJ has in additionn explicitly stated that these negotiations must be brought to a conclusion. 1222 Viewed in a broad evolutionary context, the process of arms controll still works towards the ultimate aim of achieving general and completee disarmament under strict and effective international control. Soo far, little progress has in fact been made towards creating the preconditionss for a programme for general and complete disarmament. In orderr to reach at least limited goals of arms control, partial arms control measuress have rightly obtained priority over the programme for general and completee disarmament, a choice that was already proclaimed in the 1960s by thee US and the SU. 124 The halting and reversing of the arms race, in particularr preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the gradual reductionn of military budgets on a multilaterally agreed basis, have been proclaimedd as more limited 'higher' goals of arms control. 125 Still, the objectivess of specific arms control measures should always be placed in the perspectivee of their common, 'higher' goals and the conduct of negotiations onn partial measures of arms control should always be considered in the contextt of the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.
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Inn the process towards achieving general and complete disarmament, all measuress of consensual arms control law, especially those involving disarmamentt proper, must be balanced so that at no stage of the implementationn of arms control treaties any State or group of States gains a militaryy advantage over others, and so that security is ensured equally for all participatingg States. As such, general and complete disarmament should be implementedd in an agreed sequence, by stages, until the process is completed,, taking into account the need of States to protect their security at eachh stage, with the objective of undiminished security at the lowest possiblee level of armaments and military forces. Approximate equality and parity,, as well as undiminished security, are the basis for the achievement of aa stable situation at a lower level of military potential. 127 During the whole processs it remains essential to watch that the achievement of any specific armss control measure does not result in increasing armaments in other ways orr in triggering an arms race or turning the process into other directions.
5.. International law applicable to the behaviour of States with regard to theirr national armaments outside the law of arms control
The applicability of rules of international law to the law of arms control
Armss control law does not operate independently of related relevant fields off international law, in particular the law of treaties, the law of international organisations,, the laws of war and the law on State responsibility. There is off course a major difference between rules forming part of the law of arms controll and rules being applicable to the law of arms control. For example, thee fact that the twelve-miles zone is used as a criterion in the 1971 Sea-Bed Treaty 1288 and is thus declared applicable to a treaty that bears all characteristicss of an arms control treaty, does not alter the place of this rule inn the system of general international law. It remains part of the law of the seaa and does not by itself become a rule of arms control law. Thee law of arms control, as any branch of law, does not operate in a legal vacuum.. In principle, little difficulty arises regarding the applicability of generall international law to the law of arms control, since arms control law functionss in the system of general international law as a special field of law.
Itt is important to distinguish between rules of general international law that coverr all international legal relationships, irrespective of their subject matter,, and rules of international law that are of direct importance to the law off arms control, although they fall outside its scope. The first category of ruless here refers to the general law of treaties, as laid down in the Vienna Conventionn on the Law of Treaties, and the law of State responsibility, as laidd down in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility of the ILC. The secondd category of rules referred to above relates to the international law thatt regulates the use of force, as laid down in the laws of war. Itt has been alleged that many of the concepts of the law of treaties and the laww of State responsibility, such as 'military necessity', 'force majeure' or thee operation of 'rebus sic stantibus' in a case of changed circumstances, whichh have their basis in customary international law, are not suitable for armss control issues due to their inherent vagueness and ambiguity. 129 There iss however no valid legal reason why customary international law should not applyy to the law of arms control. On the contrary, the 'juridification' which takess place in the sphere of arms control and which justifies the treatment of armss control and disarmament law as a special branch of international law entailss precisely this embedding of that law into the system of general internationall law. 130 Naturally, in situations where and to the extent that the laww of arms control sets its own rules that conflict with rules of general internationall law, the applicability of the general rules of international law willl generally be subsidiary, subject to the principle of lex specialis derogat legilegi generali. But even in such situations, specific circumstances could be imaginedd in which application of the general rules of international law might bee contemplated. The consequences of the applicability of the general law of treatiess and the law of State responsibility will be discussed in chapter [7] , sincee concurrence of arms control law and general international law is an issuee arising in regard to the consequences of non-compliance with arms controll treaties. Thee specific branches of law that are distinct from, but of direct importance to,, the law of arms control because of their subject matter, are the constituentt parts of the laws of war, viz. the ius ad bellum and the ius in 
bello.bello.
nxnx In the next paragraph, the effects of those fields of law on the law of armss control will be briefly discussed.
The law of arms control and the laws of war
Inn its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the question of the legality of the threat or usee of nuclear weapons, the ICJ provided an overview of the law most directlyy applicable to issues of arms control.
132 From this Opinion, it is possiblee to determine what restraints are posed on the freedom of behaviour off States with regard to the use or threat of use of their national armaments outsidee the rules of arms control law. The ius ad bellum is that part of the lawss of war that determines under what circumstances the use or threat of usee of weapons is allowed in international law. Contemporary ius ad bellum iss codified in the Charter of the UN, which in general terms prohibits the aggressivee threat or use of weapons in international relations (Art. 2(4)). However,, provision has been made for the contingency that a State infringes thiss rule and, without authorisation of the UNSC, without indeed making anyy attempt to obtain such authorisation, proceeds to take steps against anotherr State amounting to the use of force. A State that is the victim of suchh aggression has the right to take emergency action by way of selfdefence,, albeit that any use and threat of use of armed force must be in conformityy with the Charter of the UN and forceful self-defence in particularr must be in conformity with Art. 51 of the Charter and the principless of proportionality and necessity. Customary international law not onlyy prohibits the use of force in international relations, but recognises a rightt to self-defence as well. 133 Depending on the interpretation of the customaryy right of self-defence, self-defence may be considered lawful in otherr situations but those covered by the codified variant. Generally, an armedd attack must be in progress (or must at least be imminent 134 ) in order too give rise to the lawful resort to self-defence. The use of military force outsidee the context of self-defence, such as recourse to armed reprisals in timess of peace, is unlawful. 135 Itt should be kept in mind that specific treaty or customary law-based prohibitionss on the use of particular weapons are actually prohibitions of use off those weapons in self-defence or in collective security operations authorisedd by the UNSC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In the absencee of explicit legal prohibitions, States must be presumed to have the rightt to embark upon weapons programmes such as testing and development, measuress associated with readiness and targeting, and determinations of reliabilityy precisely because they are legally entitled to defend themselves (especiallyy in wars of surprise or deception). Finally, it should be noted that collectivee self-defence in regional organisations and alliances is also allowedd under the ius ad bellum. The use of force applied by a State whose rightss have not been directly infringed, in fulfilment of its obligations to an alliancee for the defence of its ally in response to aggression affecting that ally,, is legal assistance. Furthermoree and in addition, the threat or use of weapons must be in conformityy with the ius in bello, better known as international humanitarian laww or the humanitarian laws of war. There is obviously a relationship betweenn the law of arms control and the humanitarian laws of war. Whereas thee first is meant to contribute to international security and to the avoidance off large-scale armed conflict, the second is meant to reduce the horrors of armedd conflict once it has nevertheless broken out. 136 An obvious distinction betweenn both fields of law is of course that the humanitarian laws of war directlyy address the behaviour of individuals (especially combatants), whereass arms control law is directed at regulating the behaviour of States. Thee branch of law known as international humanitarian law consists of the so-calledd 'Hague Law' (the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907) and the 'Genevaa Law' (Conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929, 1949) , which are highly interrelated. 1377 Apart from specific regulations in the 'Hague' and 'Geneva' law,, the freedom of behaviour of States with regard to the use of their nationall armaments is limited by some general principles of the humanitariann laws of war which find their origin in customary international law.. The Court in its 1996 Advisory Opinion dealt with international humanitariann law in two main principles, viz. the principle of distinction and thee principle of prohibition of unnecessary suffering. 138 The freedom to choosee methods and means of injuring the enemy in an international armed
